From Barcelona to Bayern Munich: The evolution of Pep Guardiola’s intriguing formations

Pep Guardiola

"I give you my word that we will put in an effort. I don't know if we'll win, but we'll persist. Put on your seat belts, because we're going to have fun."

Two trophy-less seasons had passed at the Nou Camp when ‘Pep’ Guardiola was appointed manager of FC Barcelona ahead of the 2008/09 season; the above were his words during his presentation to the fans. He was tasked with resurrecting the fortunes of one of the most famous European clubs in football and bringing back the glory days to Catalonia.

Six full seasons on, he stands out as one of the best managers in world football, the reputation of both Barcelona and his own personal brand greatly enhanced.

The name Guardiola does not merely represent a man any more; it has come to represent a faith, a belief, a philosophy; one that has delivered success on a consistent basis at the highest level. Whether you love his tactics or hate them, there is no disputing the fact that ‘talking tactics’ and ‘formation fiddling’ just went up to a whole new level with his coaching in play. And if there’s one word that would aptly sum up all of Guardiola’s coaching adventures so far, it would be ‘dynamism’.

With Europe’s top leagues on hold due to the international break, it’s a good time to take a look at the evolution of Pep’s formations from Barcelona to Bayern Munich. For ever so quietly, away from the main stories making the rounds in the continent, Guardiola’s Bayern have made another impressive start and are looking the best amongst all the reigning league champions. That’s not all; Guardiola has thrown in another new tweak in the Bavarian giants’ strategy, which has been quite fascinating.

Pep’s Barcelona and the 4-3-3

Even before we get to talking about the actual formations, I think it is essential that we fully recognize Pep’s philosophy – the philosophy to build teams on the foundations of unison, work rate, patience, ball movement, zonal play, positional play and finally dynamism, both in formations as well as personnel. Each of Guardiola’s acquisitions was done with a specific goal in mind.

In his all-conquering first season, when Barcelona won the treble, Guardiola operated predominantly with a 4-3-3 formation. While many critics believe that all he did was put together a group of some of the most talented players around, that is not necessarily true. Guardiola had a plan and a reason for putting in each of the players that he inserted regularly into his line-ups.

Holding possession by moving the ball both laterally and forward with crisp, short passes was the principle that they religiously stuck to. And they would wait for their opportunities when the opposing defence would get unhinged to strike the final blow. This early version though played slightly quicker, largely due to the presence of forwards Thierry Henry, who played wide left, Samuel Eto’o, who played through the middle, and Lionel Messi, who started wide right.

Behind that trio was Sergio Busquets, promoted from the B team, in the holding role, with Xavi and Andres Iniesta to his right and left respectively. Eto’o at the time was at the height of his powers, while Messi had still not reached his magical peak yet. So utilizing the pace and power of Henry and Eto’o, while relying on Messi’s ability to dribble and draw defenders, was essential.

Xavi played behind the front three as the deep-lying playmaker and Busquets played the roles of anchor-man and Xavi’s wingman, always moving with him, protecting him from opposing defenders and acting as a foil to receive and spray passes. He was also the added cover for the backline, slotting in for one of the centre-backs, notably Gerard Pique, whenever he ventured forward.

Iniesta would venture further forward as the advanced playmaker, either going central to support the forward trio or taking up the space out wide vacated by Henry or Messi. This also required a very hard-working central striker and Eto’o did just that, sometimes falling back to receive the ball and actually allowing Henry and Messi to work as a front two.

Messi’s conversion into a striker opened up a world of possibilities for Barca

Subsequently, Guardiola converted Messi into a full-fledged striker from a winger, and Eto’o and Henry would depart. Zlatan Ibrahimovic was bought in as Guardiola wanted to find a different way of scoring goals, but that experiment didn’t go very well and he used him sparingly.

This was when the triangle offense really came into its own, as Barca’s players would move forward with the ball, triangulating their passing with almost geometric precision to unseat teams. Can you believe that 2008-09 was the last time that Messi scored less than 49 goals in all competitions?

David Villa would take up Henry’s role out wide on the left after the Frenchman’s departure, and Pedro would take up the wide right position. However, Pedro wasn’t a regular in the team and Guardiola would go quite a few games with Iniesta/Villa/Messi as the front three.

Fabregas playing as a false forward

Then came the acquisition of Cesc Fabregas and the introduction of the false nine concept. With Fabregas and also Alexis Sanchez in the side, Guardiola had a new level of freedom and dexterity with which to operate. Both Fabregas and Sanchez could play in a multitude of positions, which is why they were bought. Fabregas enabled Pep to play the striker-less formations, the conventional 4-4-2 with Messi and Pedro/Sanchez up front, and the 4-1-3-2 with him playing in a midfield three with Iniesta and Xavi and Pedro, and Sanchez either side of Messi up front.

Defensively, Alves would bomb forward on the right with Puyol covering for him. That would result in Abidal falling back into the left side of a back three, with Pique and Puyol. Also, the long balls were sparingly employed by Pep’s Barca sides as they lacked the height and physicality up front and also because their defenders were more comfortable playing the ball out on the ground as Pique continuously did. Pique’s forays forward also meant a covering job for Busquets to drop back and aid Puyol and Abidal.

Throughout his time at Barca, there were two players outside of Messi that were of utmost importance to make the formation work and make it dynamic – Alves and Abidal.

Alves was key in the attacking areas of the right flank. His intricate interchanges with Messi in the opposition half were among Barcelona’s biggest threats. When Messi moved into the middle as a false nine, Alves continued to play high up the pitch, importantly stretching the play, especially since both Villa and Pedro too were more inclined to move in from out wide.

Alves’ ability to go up and down so regularly and with such frightening results made up for the lack of a right winger or right midfielder. His forward menace also managed to keep the opposition left-back pinned down in his own half.

Eric Abidal (left) celebrates scoring a goal with Dani Alves (right) in a Copa del Rey match against Real Madrid at the Santigao Bernabeu in January 2012

Abidal was hugely important in compensating for Alves. He would push forward when necessary, but his ability to sense danger and drop deep to operate as an additional third centre-back when required were irreplaceable. He also covered for Busquets and Pique in their respective roles whenever Barca were in pursuit of a goal and pushed more bodies forward. Abidal was the guy who made the formation tick at the back with his amazing ability to play left-back, centre-back and defensive midfield to perfection.

All in all, Guardiola’s formula at Barca for much of his stay was built on the full-backs, dribbling centre-backs, the wide forwards who would dart in and the midfield duo of Iniesta and Xavi and later the concept of the ‘false forward’.

Bayern 1.0 – Beginnings with 4-1-4-1

German giants Bayern Munich came calling for Guardiola’s services and he agreed to take over the reins from the 2013-14 season onwards in what was a tough act to follow as his predecessor Jupp Heynckes signed off in some style leading the Bavarians to a historic treble with a team that was devastatingly destructive.

Bayern 1.0 saw Guardiola employ a 4-1-4-1 formation. This formation was built to explore Bayern’s depth in midfield especially around the ability of Toni Kroos to distribute, move up and down the middle of the pitch and also play as a playmaker. While at Barca, Guardiola had players of short stature at his disposal who were very good in possession; at Bayern he had more direct players in the likes of Thomas Müller, Arjen Robben and Franck Ribery and he tried to cater to their strengths by banking on the influential Kroos.

The 4-1-4-1

Philip Lahm, possibly the best right-back in the world was given a new role by Guardiola as a holding midfielder breaking up the erstwhile duo of Bastian Schweinsteiger and Javi Martinez that his predecessor used to telling effect. His need for a more mobile holding player with good passing range saw him make the shift and that meant Rafinha would take Lahm’s place at right-back.

However, the full-backs under this system were part of a mobile triumvirate that would move up and down with Lahm and would more often than not join up with the two central midfielders to make a four in the middle occupying the space vacated by the two wingers who’ve joined up in attack. The use of ‘false full-backs’ was made possible by the presence of Ribery and Robben, who provided the width with their forays out wide to reduce the necessity for advanced full-backs. In the absence of one or both, Alaba and Rafinha tended to play in a more traditional full-back role.

And it was that versatility that got them off to such a flying start last season, eventually helping them win the Bundesliga at a canter. Opposing teams simply could not handle the many different attacking formations in the form of an attacking double-pivot of either Götze/Robben, Götze/Müller or Müller/Robben. Also, unlike at Barca, this Guardiola team played a good number of good long balls because – a. their defenders weren’t the dribbly kind like Pique and b. the presence of aerially gifted players such as Müller and Mario Mandzukic.

The presence of multiple playmakers ensured that they could swap roles freely and the ones not on the ball could then run the channels effectively, complementarily opening up space for each other to operate in.
The overlying emphasis of this formation was to always have three central midfielders on the pitch at any point of time. That’s why Pep went out and bought Thiago Alcantara, not for old time’s sake. Lahm explained as much in an interview last year:

“Also, outwardly it appears as if we’ve changed our system, but if you look more closely we still have three central midfielders on the pitch. Whether there’s one No.6 [a primarily defensive holding midfielder] and two No.10s [offensive midfielders], or one No.6 and two No.8s [more creative holding midfielders] or maybe one No.8, one No.6 and one No.10 – there are three players in central midfield. To give you an example, last season Toni Kroos [a typical No.10] sometimes played in the No.6 position alongside Bastian Schweinsteiger. It’s open to debate whether or not you could have spoken of two No. 6 players in those moments. So each of the three players fills the position with his own identity and his characteristics. That is what counts.”

 

The attacking pivots also helped in pressing from the front and while not as intense and harrying as they were under Heynckes, Bayern were still very effective doing their version of the Barca press to dispossess opponents.

The difference in Guardiola’s triangle systems at Barca (above) and Bayern (below)

This formation was another continuation in the triangle system of Guardiola, except that instead of widening the pitch to stretch the defence like at Barca, here the system was about overloading the centre of the park with triangles formed all around the centremost midfielder, usually either Kroos, Lahm or Schweinsteiger.
And this system also kept up the bargain of tactical flexibility for Guardiola as it could morph into a 3-4-1-2, 4-4-2, 4-3-3, even a 2-4-4 at times if chasing a game.

The 4-1-4-1 for all its tactical nuances had some weaknesses. It involved the full-backs playing almost as midfielders and with Lahm’s solidity no longer present at right-back, it exposed Bayern, who played a high defensive line, to individual mistakes and long passes. And as brilliant a sweeper-keeper as Manuel Neuer is, he could not always save the day for them, especially against quality opposition.

When used ineffectively the overload of playmakers in the centre muddled the midfield and made their attack look toothless and the build-up slow. Also, they could almost never capitalize on quick counter-attacking opportunities.

Bayern wore a dejected look as they were taken apart by Real Madrid

All of this came to a head in their semi-final tie against Real Madrid in last year’s UEFA Champions League. Madrid were a side perfectly built to expose each and every flaw of this system and it was a matchup nightmare for the German side. A front six of Cristiano Ronaldo, Karim Benzema, Gareth Bale, Angel di Maria, Luka Modric and Xabi Alonso had too much pace, power, and on-ball ability to be contained by the 4-1-4-1. Ronaldo and Bale ran roughshod over the two ‘false full-backs’ and Benzema’s movement in combination with one of the two plus di Maria took the two centre-backs out of the equation as well.

Also a few players such as Mandzukic suffered as he was forced to make runs out wide and become a provider at times instead of a goal threat and that saw him lose his starting spot to a midfielder with Guardiola preferring to play Müller as the lone striker instead. Ribery and Robben were forced to make the unnatural shift to receiving the ball and quickly giving it back, instead of venturing forward to take on the defenders which took the destructive nature out of Bayern’s attacks.

Bayern 2.0 – A 3-4-3 

With all that had gone by and seeing the limitations that the 4-1-4-1 caused, Guardiola introduced a 3-4-3 system against Borussia Dortmund in the DFB Pokal final of last year to redeem himself after the chastening defeat to Madrid. And he has continued with it this season.

The backline movement in the 3-4-3

The 3-man backline sacrifices width for numerical superiority in dealing with opposing attackers while providing a man advantage in midfield.

In defence, it relies on the 3-man backline and the 4-man midfield, which includes the two wingbacks. And in attack, the formation moulds into a 3-4-1-2 or 3-4-2-1 using either one attacking midfielder (Götze/Kroos) behind two strikers (Mandzukic/Robben and Müller) or two attacking midfielders (Kroos/Müller, Kroos/Götze) and the lone striker (Robben/Müller/Mandzukic).

The 3-4-2-1 has been the one that Bayern have gone with more often and it is a very demanding formation. The two withdrawn strikers or attacking mids play a critical role as they alternate between shifting wide or tucking in behind the main striker. Due to only one striker up top and a lack of wingers, the role of the wingbacks becomes more important. Without their inputs, Bayern can't maintain their superiority when attacking. While being aggressive though, they have to remain disciplined, as they are the sole defensive cover on the wings. So even one slip-up can be costly.

However, the 3-man backline does provide an extra target against teams whose forwards press hard, like Dortmund. The extra man enables them to pass the ball out smoother. The central centre-back often functions as a key distributor, much like Pique did at Barca while the two guys either side of him push wide almost in a full-back-like position to use and cover the space.

Someone like Javi Martinez and Holger Badstuber, both of whom have played as defensive midfielders, can play centre-back better in this formation as it helps them break up play, even at the cost of leaving their position thanks to added protection from the sides and also helps in their distribution. If need be they can even step in to join the midfield to provide extra impetus in attack as the other two centre-backs would then converge to form a back-two.

Till now, Guardiola has used six different players in the full-back roles this season – Pierre Hoijberg, Juan Bernat, Philip Lahm, David Alaba, Rafinha and Sebastian Rode. Each of them offers him something different;  Bernat is more of a traditional full-back and more or less parks himself along the touchline; Alaba and Rafinha are capable of not just playing as full-backs, but also tucking into midfield while Rode and Hoijberg are more inclined to drop inwards as defensive midfielders.

Depending on what weakness a certain opponent has and what he wants to guard against regards his own team, Guardiola can pick his personnel. To top that, you have Lahm, who can play any of those positions on either side. And hence the dynamic fluidity of the wingbacks will be something to look forward to this season.

Excess baggage from South Africa hurting, rather than helping, Spain and Uruguay's chances

A few newspaper headlines after Spain’s heavy loss to the Dutch in their opening game

The word out on the streets (not just those in Brazil) is that World Cup 2014 is turning out to be the best ever in the history of the event. We’re just six days in and there have already been so many memorable moments that it has outshone some of its predecessors. There has been the notable emphasis on attack by almost all teams, with caution being thrown to the wind and teams not settling for comfortable draws early on, England not lumping long balls forward for a change...

That in turn has led to a glut of goals, the key fuel that keeps interest levels going at such a massive event, especially when fans have to stay up long into the night in most parts of the world. But, over and above those, there have been the upsets, the results that send audiences into a frenzy and those that initiate arguments and counter-arguments that run for days after the actual result. And unfortunately for Spain and Uruguay, they have been the victims of those upsets at Brazil 2014.

How did this happen? Both of the results were inconceivable before the tournament began. However, a closer look suggests that perhaps we shouldn’t be so surprised at what transpired in Salvador and Fortaleza last week. Perhaps Spain’s drubbing at the hands of the Dutch and Uruguay’s insipid display against a spirited Costa Rica side was in the works even before they stepped onto the pitch?

Spain and Uruguay were two of the final four at the last edition in South Africa in 2010; Spain the victors while Uruguay finished a very impressive fourth. But both these teams seem to have overlooked a key aspect in their preparations for this World Cup, something that the other two from the final four in South Africa (Netherlands and Germany) seem to have taken note of and duly addressed.

Both of these teams have carried with them excess baggage from the previous World Cup and it is hurting them.

Spain

World and European champions Spain were spoilt for choice in terms of talent, not just in picking a 23-man squad, but also a provisional 30-man squad for that matter. The squad has some visible new faces, but the team that took to the field against the Netherlands resembled much the same to the one from four years ago.

There were four notable changes from the team that started the final at the previous edition – Diego Costa was employed as the lone striker up front in place of David Villa, Jordi Alba took up the left-back role, previously donned by the ultra-solid Joan Capdevila, David Silva came into the starting line-up in place of Pedro Rodriguez and Sergio Ramos moved to centre-back, from his erstwhile right-back position, taking over from Carles Puyol.

The old adage is to not fix something that isn’t broke, but while the Spanish squad and system wasn’t exactly broken, there were some tweaks that were necessary. One important thing to always look at is the stage at which a particular player’s career lifecycle lies.

Xavi and Xabi Alonso together in midfield was problem number one for Spain. While Xavi’s short-passing keeps things ticking over and Alonso’s ranging aerials open the game up when it becomes congested in midfield, the duo together are slow and as such, liable to be neutralized by a midfield high on energy and industry. Xavi is into the twilight years of a very successful career and Alonso too cannot hold a midfield on his own.

Diego Costa, after his fantastic season and allegiance switch to Spain, was going to be the first-choice striker. Plus, he offered something different from their previous two forward line leaders in good heading ability along with a knack for hassling opposing defenders.

However, Costa hasn’t exactly had the best of time in the last one-and-a-half months or so prior to the tournament, with the injury he suffered and the resultant rustiness. He looked very off the pace against the Dutch despite winning the penalty for Spain’s goal. But playing him was the right thing to do; what wasn’t was picking able alternatives.

Villa showed this season that he still has plenty of game left in him, but he is the kind of striker known more for his runs behind the defence and predatory instincts. Torres, a favourite of Coach Vicente Del Bosque, expectedly made the plane to Brazil, but in terms of his career graph, he is a player who has fallen way off the charts; his glaring miss during the game, further evidence of this.

Fernando Llorente, picked for South Africa, was overlooked this time, largely due to his marginalized role at Juventus. But he should have ideally made the trip for he offers something different to Torres and Villa.

Arjen Robben (centre) of the Netherlands attacking with the ball, watched by Spain defenders Sergio Ramos (left) and Gerard Pique

In defence, the combination of Sergio Ramos and Gerard Pique at the back was run ragged by the Dutch offense. Pique is a defender who gets more credit than necessary; while he may be good in the air and at set pieces, he struggles mightily against pacy forwards for he can’t keep up with them in foot-speed. He has the turning radius of a truck which allows attackers to twist him one way and then the other, eventually putting him off balance and leaving him out of position. And him going up against one of the world’s premier attackers in Arjen Robben was always going to yield only one result – disaster.

Watching Robben go at him was like watching a hot knife cut through butter, like a nightmarish re-run for Spanish fans of when Bayern Munich dismantled Barcelona, when Robben had put Pique to the sword as in Salvador. Having seen how this particular matchup played out in the past, it was surprising that Del Bosque didn’t opt for more cover, perhaps with the use of Javi Martinez.

Ramos to his credit was often found making some last ditch interceptions, without which, the score-line could have been worse for the champs. But Ramos too in the past couple of seasons has been undone when the opponents have attacked him with high pace and a bullish centre forward. Jürgen Klopp’s Borussia Dortmund, twice in two seasons, took Ramos’ Real Madrid defence to the cleaners. But the difference lay in that Ramos had Pepe, a mobile central defensive partner, to help him out at Real, which isn’t the case at national level.

The decline has continued with captain and keeper Iker Casillas as well, one noticed by Jose Mourinho, enough to convince him to drop Casillas. For all the ire that he earned at the hands of the Spanish press for that, he must feel vindicated now.

Spain keeper Iker Casillas after his calamitous error led to Robin van Persie’s second goal

To go with that, Spain’s phenomenal run in world football also coincided with a successful period for Barcelona domestically and in Europe, a team whose players have come to form the core of the Spanish side. But since their second Euro success, the Catalan giants have found their dominance challenged and a system to combat their effective “tiki-taka” has been unearthed by more than one manager.

And that system has been beaten with the use of a directness in attack coupled with pace and shackling of the midfield engine room, where Xavi, Iniesta and Sergio Busquets operate; the very same elements that Louis Van Gaal employed with his Dutch side. Spain’s midfield quartet are no longer the all-conquering force that they used to be and with the defeats they’ve suffered in the last few years, so has their confidence.

Uruguay

Shifting the spotlight to South America and a very similar situation prevails with Uruguay. The squad almost resembles a carbon copy of the one that travelled to South Africa four years ago with a few exceptions. Oscar Tabarez and the Uruguayans have again erred along the same lines, much like Spain have. Diego Forlan is no longer the force he once was; going into the 2010 edition, Forlan was at the peak of his powers, amongst the top forwards in the game, plundering and setting up goals for Atletico Madrid. And he led the line beautifully for the South Americans, proving to be a key cog in their fourth place finish.

He is now 35 years old, and while age doesn’t necessarily always diminish a player’s capabilities, as exemplified by the peerless Andrea Pirlo, in Forlan’s case it has. He now plays for Cerezo Osaka and is nowhere near the levels he was at previously.

Luis Suarez watched on from the bench as Uruguay lost their opener 1-3 to Costa Rica in Fortaleza

Edinson Cavani found himself isolated and frustrated with a lack of service from his midfield and the second striker in Forlan. The midfield that started the game, as Tabarez played a 4-4-2, comprised of Arevalo Rios, Walter Gargano, Cristian Rodriguez and Christian Stuani, and they were utterly listless, offering hardly any incisiveness in attack.

And with forwards who struggled to create openings by themselves, the absence of Luis Suarez was all the more debilitating. In their previous campaign, despite the three-pronged attack up front it was the solidity of their midfield and defence that propelled a good portion of their success, as Cavani and Suarez at the time had still not peaked.

Their midfield was held together by the veteran Diego Perez while Alvaro Pereira provided some much needed thrust with his runs from midfield. And in defence, the two Diegos – Godin and Lugano – were watertight. Lugano, another one who is now 35, is no longer the rock in defence he once was and while Godin is right up there among the top three central defenders in the world, his captain and partner in that area makes far too many mistakes these days.

These problems just didn’t explode in their faces in the first match against Costa Rica. They plagued the team right through its qualification campaign, one of the reasons why they struggled before eventually finishing fifth and making it through the playoffs. Uruguay relied heavily on Suarez’s proficiency in front of goal and the striker’s 11 goals (he was top-scorer in the CONMEBOL qualifiers) got his team into fifth place.

Another key stat was that while Uruguay scored 25 goals, they conceded an equal number, making for a goal difference of zero; the lowest among all qualifiers from South America.

Oscar Tabarez has some tough decisions to make

No one knows why Tabarez didn’t employ either of Alvaro Pereira or Gaston Ramirez in the opener against Costa Rica. Was he resting his key players ahead of the clashes against England and Italy? If that was the case, was Tabarez underestimating the Costa Ricans? The most damning stat from that game was that a defender had the most number of passes (67); that happened to be their left-back Martin Caceres, who to his credit, was the most hardworking player on the day for the South American giants and did his best to spark his team’s attack. Maxi Pereira had the second-highest (65) indicating Uruguay’s reliance on their full-backs when in possession.

There are still two games to go – Chile and England loom

While things didn’t exactly go right for these two teams, there is still time for them to set it right. Spain take on Chile in their second game later tonight, in what is a must-win encounter, with Chile having won their opener. It is a rematch from the last World Cup where the two teams met in the group stage with Spain coming out 2-1 winners. The defending champions have the personnel necessary to give their team a different look.

Del Bosque might consider switching to his forward-less line-up that worked so well at the Euros, employing Cesc Fabregas as the advanced man. Also Juanfran for Azpilicueta at right-back may be a move worth considering for the Atletico Madrid man is sounder defensively and is a smart operator in being able to bomb forward in support of his teammates. Also, the younger Koke to partner Xabi Alonso in midfield while withdrawing Xavi, is a move that could be on the cards as Del Bosque has not shied away from making changes in the past.

Spain coach Vicente Del Bosque has not been afraid to change things up in the past

For Uruguay, Suarez in all likelihood will take to the field against England tomorrow night and that should give his compatriots a huge shot in the arm along with some much needed motivation. Elsewhere, Tabarez has to consider making a change in his midfield too. Either of Stuani or Rodriguez will make way for Suarez, but the coach might as well replace the remaining one also with someone like Ramirez or Alvaro Pereira.

It has been one loss only for both these teams; just three points surrendered. Both have two matches remaining to right their ship in time before the opportunity to get to the knockout rounds slips away from their grasp. They have made similar mistakes to past champions in France (2002) and Italy (2010) in failing to refresh their squads and believing that continuity will ensure success.

However, they must not continue with that beaten path but rather make smart adjustments because otherwise they will suffer the same fate as France and Italy and be heading home by the time the Round of 16 comes along. They will both face opponents playing a brand of football suited to exploiting their weaknesses, but with the right adjustments, they can overcome the challenge.

All of the footballing world’s eyes will be on them to see if they can do just that and pick themselves up from the early punches that they have taken at Brazil 2014. Two nations in particular will watch on with expectant eyes.